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Abstract
Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is
saved and themany die? According to the standard utilitarian justification, the former is better because it has
a greater sum total of well-being. This justification involves a controversial form of moral aggregation,
because it is based on a comparison between aggregates of different people’s well-being. Still, an alternative
justification—the Argument for Best Outcomes—does not involve moral aggregation. I extend the Argu-
ment for Best Outcomes to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without moral aggregation.
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Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the
one is saved and the many die? Most of us judge that the former is better. But what justifies this
evaluation? The standard utilitarian answer is that it would be better if themanywere saved, because
the combined gain in well-being for the many if they were saved would be greater than the gain in
well-being for the one if he or she were saved.1 This form of utilitarianism justifies evaluations by
The Total Principle: Outcome X is at least as good as outcome Y if and only if the sum total of
well-being is at least as great in X as in Y.
The justification by the Total Principle is an example ofmoral aggregation, which some people, such
as John M. Taurek and T. M. Scanlon, find problematic. Taurek, for example, complains that
It is not my way to thinking of [the people who need help] as each having a certain objective
value, determined however it is we determine the objective value of things, and then to make
some estimate of the combined value of the [many] as against the one. (1977, 307)2
Scanlon is somewhat less clear, demanding that
the justifiability of a moral principle depends only on various individuals’ reasons for
objecting to that principle and alternatives to it. (1998, 229)
An aggregate or sum of several individuals’ reasons, however, still depends on those individual
reasons. Yet, since Scanlon takes his demand to rule out justifications that appeal to a ‘sum of a
certain sort of value’ (230), he seems to have in mind a requirement that is, more or less, equivalent
to Taurek’s requirement.
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative
CommonsAttribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction
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1Timmons (2013, 117) and Portmore (2020, 5–6) put forward utilitarian accounts of rightness with this kind of total
justification.
2See also Rawls 1967, 59–60.
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These moral-aggregation critics object that moral justifications should not be based on com-
parisons between aggregates of people’s claims or well-being.3 Unfortunately, this objection, which
wemay call theObjection fromMoral Aggregation, is rarely put forward in a precise manner. Still, a
plausible explication is that the objection rejects justifications that involve moral aggregation in the
following sense:4
A justification of a moral evaluation involvesmoral aggregation if and only if the justification
is fundamentally based in part on a comparison where at least one of the relata is an aggregate
of the claims or well-being of more than one individual.
Rejecting moral aggregation means accepting
The Individualist Restriction: The only comparisons that a justification of a moral evaluation
may be fundamentally based on are comparisons where no relatum is an aggregate of the
claims or well-being of more than one individual.
The Objection from Moral Aggregation is not that moral evaluations of aggregates of claims are
necessarily problematic.What is supposed to be problematic is that comparisons of such aggregates
are part of the justifications of moral evaluations. So the evaluation that it’s better to save the many
than to save the one needn’t be problematic. The target of the Objection fromMoral Aggregation is
the justification of this evaluation by the Total Principle or by some other form of moral
aggregation.5 In fact, many moral-aggregation critics believe that there is an adequate justification
of its being better to save the many than to save the one.6 They believe that, while the standard
utilitarian justification involves moral aggregation, there is an alternative justification that does
not—namely, the Argument for Best Outcomes.7
In this paper, I will extend the Argument for Best Outcomes with a further principle to show that
any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without relying on the Total Principle or any other formof
moral aggregation.
3In taking the problem of moral aggregation to be a problem about justification, I’m following Taurek. He argues that the
relative numbers of people involved or any notion of the sum of different people’s losses or gains shouldn’t be part of the
justification of acts and duties (1977, 312), nor a ‘ground for amoral obligation’ (297–302), nor a ‘source or derivation’ of duties
(310), nor ‘something in itself of significance in determining our course of action’ (293), nor something ‘that has relevance for
choice and preference’ (2021, 321).
4The aim here is to capture the formofmoral aggregationwhichTaurek (1977, 307–10, 313) and Scanlon (1998, 229–30) find
problematic inmoral justifications. My account is, I think, a better interpretation of what themoral-aggregation critics object to
than Hirose’s (2015, 24) extensional account. On Hirose’s account, no lexical principle for evaluating outcomes would be
aggregative. Consider, for example, a variant of utilitarianism that uses the Leximax Equity Criterion (defined later) as a
tiebreaker in case two outcomes have the same sum total of well-being. According to this lexical variant of utilitarianism, an
outcomeX is at least as good as an outcome Y if and only if, and because, either (i)X has a greater sum total of well-being than Y
or (ii) the outcomes have equal sum totals of well-being and X would be at least as good as Y according to the Leximax Equity
Criterion. This variant seems to involve a form of moral aggregation that’s objectionable on the same grounds as the standard
utilitarian justification by the Total Principle, but it wouldn’t be aggregative on Hirose’s account; see Gustafsson 2017, 966–67.
On the other hand, Fleurbaey and Tungodden’s (2010, 402)Minimal Aggregation condition is satisfied by some plausibly non-
aggregative theories such as theMaximax Equity Criterion, which says that an outcomeX is at least as good as outcome Y if and
only if the maximum well-being of any individual is at least as high in X as in Y.
5Taurek (2021, 321–22), for example, admits that he has no compelling objection to someone who judges that it’s better to
save the many than to save the one if this evaluation is not based on (nor unmediated by) the alleged fact that the combined
suffering of the many would be greater than the suffering for the one.
6Among others, Kamm (1993, 75–98) and Scanlon (1998, 229–41).
7See Kamm 1993, 85, where it was called the Aggregation Argument. The new name comes from Kamm 2007, 32. For a
structurally similar objection to indifference between saving the one and saving the many (which does not rely on Anonymity),
see Kavka 1979, 291–92.
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1. The Argument for Best Outcomes
The Argument for Best Outcomes relies on three principles.8 The first is based on the idea that
morality demands impartiality between people, other things being equal (Sen 1974, 391 and
Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson 2005, 49):
Anonymity: If outcomes X and Y only differ in that the identities of some people who exist in
these outcomes have been permuted, then X and Y are equally good.
This principle is sometimes called ‘Impartiality’.9 But the principle requires more than mere
impartiality between outcomes that are alike except for a permutation of identities; it requires that
the outcomes are equally good. It wouldn’t be any less impartial if the outcomes were incomparable
in value than if they were equally good. Because, just like equality, incomparability is symmetric. It
doesn’t favour any one of the relata.
While Anonymity is compelling, it isn’t beyond dispute: Anonymity rules out partiality, and
partiality is part of common-sense morality (specifically, the idea that you may give extra weight to
your own well-being and the well-being of your friends and family).10 Yet, for the purposes of our
current discussion, the key feature of Anonymity is not that it’s self-evident or undeniable but that
it’s free from moral aggregation—that is, Anonymity does not involve any comparisons of
aggregates of people’s claims or well-being. This feature is still clearer for the following weakened
variant, which suffices for the argument:
Pairwise Anonymity: If outcomes X and Y only differ in that the identities of two people who
exist in these outcomes have been permuted, then X and Y are equally good.
Consider the following outcomes A and B, which only differ in that the identities of two people
(P1 and P2) have been permuted (a third person, P3, is unaffected):
SinceA andB only differ in that the identities ofP1 andP2 have been permuted, Pairwise Anonymity
entails thatA and B are equally good. If two outcomes only differ in that the identities of two people
have been permuted, then no further person is affected and any loss for one of the two is perfectly
matched by a gain for the other.11 In a choice between A and B, for instance, any loss for one of P1
P1 P2 P3
A 4 0 0
B 0 4 0
8Here, I follow Hirose’s (2001, 341) axiomatic presentation of the Argument for Best Outcomes. An advantage of his
presentation is that it makes clear that the Argument for Best Outcomes isn’t open to Otsuka’s (2000, 291–92) objection that the
argument implicitly balances aggregates of claims.
9See, for instance, Hirose 2001, 341.
10A strong argument against partiality is that it leads to outcomes that are worse for all parties in some Prisoner’s Dilemma
situations; see Parfit 1984, 95–98. For the original Prisoner’s Dilemma case, see Tucker 1980, 101.
11To see that this needn’t be the case with Anonymity, consider the following outcomes (Chapman 2010, 182):
Outcome B0 is just like outcome A0 except that people’s identities have been permuted. Accordingly, Anonymity entails that A0
and B0 are equally good. But P1 loses 2 units of well-being if B0 is chosen overA0 , while no one gains asmuch. So there’s no parity
P1 P2 P3
A0 3 1 2
B0 1 2 3
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and P2 is perfectly matched by a gain for the other. So, by only making one-to-one comparisons
between individuals, we have that there is an equivalence of gains and losses betweenA and B. Even
though this justification balances gains against losses, it only balances the gain for one individual
against the loss for another individual. Hence the justification avoids moral aggregation, and it
conforms to the Individualist Restriction.12
The second principle is based on the idea that if one outcome dominates another outcome in
terms of individual well-being, then its better (Broome 1987, 410; 1991, 165):13
The Strong Principle of Dominance: If (i) the same people exist in outcomes X and Y, (ii) each
of these people has at least as high well-being in X as in Y, and (iii) some person has higher
well-being in X than in Y, then X is better than Y.
Consider the following outcomes B and C, where everyone is equally well off in B as in C except P3
who is better off in C than in B:
By comparing each person’s well-being in B with their well-being in C, we can conclude that each
person has at least as high well-being in C as in B and that P3 has higher well-being in C than in B.
Based on these intrapersonal comparisons, the Strong Principle of Dominance entails that C is
better thanB.This justification does not involvemoral aggregation because it doesn’t balance claims
or well-being between different people.
The third principle is the following principle of the logic of value (Arrow 1951, 13; Sen 1970, 2;
2017, 47; and Quinn 1977, 77):
Transitivity: If outcomeX is at least as good as outcome Y and Y is at least as good as outcome
Z, then X is at least as good as Z.
P1 P2 P3
B 0 4 0
C 0 4 4
of individual gains and losses betweenA0 and B0. Yet, since more than two people’s identities are permuted in the move fromA0
to B0, Pairwise Anonymity does not entail that these outcomes are equally good. To derive that conclusion, we need to apply
Pairwise Anonymity twice (for example, permute P1 and P2 in A0 then permute P2 and P3) and then apply Transitivity (defined
later).
12We may be able to justify Anonymity (and the logically weaker Pairwise Anonymity) without balancing any gains and
losses. An alternative justification is based on the claim that personal identities have no moral significance: it’s only the list of
well-being levels that is of moral concern, not who has which level. On this justification, we don’t need to compare any gains or
losses to derive thatA and B are equally good.We only need to compare the well-being levels between individuals: P1, P2, and P3
inA have the same well-being as P2, P1, and P3 in B respectively. A disadvantage of this alternative justification of Anonymity is
that it may seem to violate the separateness of persons (see Gauthier 1963, 126–27; Nagel 1970, 138; Rawls 1971, 24; 1999, 27;
and Nozick 1974, 32–33). The Objection from the Separateness of Persons is, roughly, the objection that losses can only be
legitimate if they are compensated whereas a loss for one person cannot be compensated by any gains for other people. Yet it’s
hard to know what to make of this objection. Many of those who insist on the separateness of persons (for instance, Rawls 1971,
83; 1999, 72 and Nagel 1970, 142; 1978, 22) defend the Difference Principle (see note 17). Yet the Difference Principle also
entails (i) Anonymity and (ii) that personal identities do notmatter in the sense that it doesn’t matter who has which well-being
level (see Brink 2020, 386–88). Could the Objection from the Separateness of Persons challenge Pairwise Anonymity? Consider
the use of Pairwise Anonymity in, for instance, the justification of A’s being equally as good as B. If A is replaced by B, then P1
suffers an uncompensated loss. But, if B is replaced by A, then P2 suffers an equally great uncompensated loss. So, in terms of
uncompensated losses, A and B seem equally bad—and, thus, equally good. Hence the separateness of persons does not
challenge Pairwise Anonymity.
13The clause that the same people exist in outcomes X and Y should be read as saying that the set of people who exist in X is
the same as the set of people who exist in Y.
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From (i) thatA andB are equally good and (ii) thatC is better thanB, it follows by Transitivity thatC
is better thanA.As long as the first two evaluations—(i) and (ii)—have been justified withoutmoral
aggregation, Transitivity provides a justification of C’s being better than A which does not involve
moral aggregation (because, for this justification, Transitivity does not rely on any other compar-
isons than the first two).
With these principles, we can state theArgument for Best Outcomes. Suppose that getting 4 units
of well-being in outcomes A, B, and C corresponds to getting saved and that getting 0 units
corresponds to not being saved. In A, only P1 is saved. In B, only P2 is saved. And, in C, both P2 and
P3 are saved but P1 is not. Hence we have the following outcomes:14
We can then argue as follows:
The Argument for Best Outcomes
(1) A and B are equally good. Pairwise Anonymity
(2) C is better than B. The Strong Principle of Dominance
(3) C is better than A. (1), (2), Transitivity
We have argued, without relying on moral aggregation, that C is better than A. The difference
betweenA and C is that, ifAwere chosen over C, only one person (P1) would be saved but, ifCwere
chosen, two other people (P2 and P3) would be saved. Therefore, we have an argument for its being
better that a greater number of people are saved, and this argument does not rely on moral
aggregation.15
It may be objected that the Argument for Best Outcomes relies on moral aggregation in the
move from (1) and (2) to (3). The evaluation in (3) is justified by (1), (2), and Transitivity. So C’s
being better than A is justified in part by A’s being equally as good as B and in part by C’s being
better than B. But A’s being equally as good as B is a comparison of the whole of outcome A with
the whole of outcome B. And C’s being better than B is a comparison of the whole of outcome C
with the whole of outcome B. Each of these compared outcomes includes the well-being of three
people. Hence the justification of the evaluation in (3) is based in part on comparisons where at
least one of the relata is an aggregate of (among other things) the well-being of more than one
individual.
Even so, this does not show that the Argument for Best Outcomes involves moral aggregation,
because these comparisons that the justification of (3) is based on—that is, (1) and (2)—can in turn
be justified without moral aggregation. So the justification of (3) by (1), (2), and Transitivity is not
P1 P2 P3
A 4 0 0
B 0 4 0
C 0 4 4
14Here and in the rest of the paper, we assume that outcomes with all possible distributions of well-being exist. See Broome
1991, 80–81.
15While we have applied the Argument for Best Outcomes to a one-versus-two case, the argument also works, changing what
needs to be changed, for any n-versus-m case, where m is greater than n. Just replace P1 with the people in the n-sized group,
replace P2 with n people out of the m-sized group, and replace P3 with the remaining people in the m-sized group. The only
difference, in case there are two or more people in the n-group, is that Pairwise Anonymity is no longer sufficient to justify (1).
So, in that case, we need to justify (1) either by Anonymity or by repeated application of Pairwise Anonymity and Transitivity.
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fundamentally based on a comparison where at least one of the relata is an aggregate of the well-
being of more than one individual.16
2. The Extended Argument for Best Outcomes
The Argument for Best Outcomes can support the utilitarian evaluation that saving the greater
number is better if the competing claims have equal strength. Still, the three principles that the
argument relies on are too weak to allow us to derive all utilitarian evaluations. For instance, these
principles are too weak to show that saving the many is better than saving the one if the benefit for
the one is greater than the benefit for each of themany. Consider an outcomeDwhere P2 and P3 are
saved but their well-being is slightly lower than P1’s well-being in outcome A:
To see that no valid argument based on just Anonymity, the Strong Principle of Dominance, and
Transitivity could show thatD is better thanA, consider the Leximax Equity Criterion—a variant of
the Leximin Equity Criterion which prioritizes the better off rather than the worse off.
The Leximax Equity Criterion evaluates outcomeswith the same population as follows: If the best
off in a first outcome are better off than the best off in a second outcome, then the first outcome is
better than the second outcome. If the best off in the outcomes are equally well-off, remove one of
the best off in each outcome and repeat the test until one outcome emerges as better than the other
or there is no one left in the outcomes. If there is no one left in the outcomes, then the outcomes are
equally good.
The Leximax Equity Criterion satisfies Anonymity, the Strong Principle of Dominance, and
Transitivity, but it entails that A is better than D (and thus that D is not better than A), because the
best-off person in A is better off than each of the best-off people in D (d’Aspremont and Gevers
1977, 204). Therefore, since utilitarianism entails that D is better than A, there is at least one
utilitarian evaluation that cannot be derived with just Anonymity, the Strong Principle of Dom-
inance, and Transitivity.
So, in order to justify the evaluation thatD is better thanA, we need an additional principle. And,
if we want to justify this evaluation without moral aggregation, the additional principle cannot rely
on moral aggregation. Even so, there is a principle that fits the bill. Consider
Supervenience on Individual Stakes: If the same people exist in outcomes X, Y, U, and V and,
for each personPwho exists in these outcomes, P’s well-being inXminus P’s well-being inY is
equal to P’s well-being in Uminus P’s well-being in V, then X and Y are equally good if and
only if U and V are equally good.
This principle says that, if everyone stands to gain or lose the same amount if X were chosen over Y
as they would ifUwere chosen over V, then the evaluation of these pairs should be the same (in the
sense that, if the outcomes in one pair are equally good, the outcomes in the other pair should be so
P1 P2 P3
A 4 0 0
D 0 3 3
16Timmermann (2004, 109n3) objects that, while neither Pairwise Anonymity nor the Strong Principle of Dominance
involves moral aggregation, their conjunction does so. Note, however, that the Argument for Best Outcomes does not rely on
this conjunction in the justification of anymoral evaluation. Claim (1) is justified by Pairwise Anonymity alone, and claim (2) is
justified by the Strong Principle of Dominance alone. The conjunction of (1) and (2), which we derive from the conjuncts by
propositional logic, is not a furthermoral evaluation in need of any furthermoral justification. Hence the conjunction of (1) and
(2) need not be justified by the conjunction of Pairwise Anonymity and the Strong Principle of Dominance.
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too). Note that the consequent of Supervenience on Individual Stakes is biconditional; it only lets us
derive thatX andY are equally good conditional on thatU andV are equally good (and vice versa). If
the evaluation that U and V are equally good is justified without violating the Individualist
Restriction, then Supervenience on Individual Stakes can justify that X and Y are equally good
without violating the Individualist Restriction, because, in addition to the evaluation of U and V,
Supervenience on Individual Stakes only relies on intrapersonal comparisons of gains and losses
between pairs of outcomes. Hence, if U’s being equally as good as V can be justified without moral
aggregation, then X’s being equally as good as Y can be justified by Supervenience on Individual
Stakes without relying on moral aggregation.
For an example illustrating the application of Supervenience on Individual Stakes, consider the
following pairs of outcomes:
If outcome A were chosen over outcome E, then P1 would be 2 units better off, P2 would be 2 units
worse off, and P3 would be neither better nor worse off. And, if outcome F were chosen over
outcomeG, we get the same result: P1 would be 2 units better off, P2 would be 2 units worse off, and
P3 would be neither better nor worse off. Since, in thismanner, each individual stands to gain or lose
the same amount if A were chosen over E as they would if F were chosen over G, Supervenience on
Individual Stakes entails thatA and E are equally good if F andG are equally good. Suppose that the
evaluation that F and G are equally good is justified by Pairwise Anonymity (a justification that
doesn’t rely on moral aggregation). Then the evaluation that A and E are equally good can be
justified by Supervenience on Individual Stakes without relying on moral aggregation.
The point here is not that Supervenience on Individual Stakes is self evident or uncontro-
versial. The principle reflects utilitarianism’s insensitivity to whether the distribution of well-
being is equal, which is controversial from the perspective of some egalitarian theories.17 While
there’s no difference with respect to inequality between F andG, there is more inequality inA than
in E.18 For the purposes of our discussion, however, the key feature of Supervenience on
P1 P2 P3
F 2 0 2
G 0 2 2
P1 P2 P3
A 4 0 0
E 2 2 0
17To see that Supervenience on Individual Stakes rules out the evaluative version of Rawls’s (1971, 83; 1999, 72) Difference
Principle, consider the following pairs of outcomes:
The evaluative version of the Difference Principle can be stated as follows:
The Evaluative Difference Principle: OutcomeX is at least as good as outcomeY if and only if theminimumwell-being of
any person is at least as high in X as in Y.
According to the Evaluative Difference Principle, we have that outcome H is better than outcome I and that outcomes J and K
are equally good. But, if J and K are equally good, we have, from Supervenience on Individual Stakes, that H and I are
equally good.
18Moving from A to E involves a transfer of well-being from a better-off person to a worse-off person (and this transfer does
not make the recipient better off than the donor). So, by the Pigou-Dalton principle (Pigou 1912, 24 and Dalton 1920, 351), E is
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Individual Stakes is that it satisfies the Individualist Restriction and hence that it doesn’t involve
moral aggregation.19
We have that each one of Pairwise Anonymity, the Strong Principle of Dominance, Supervenience
on Individual Stakes, and Transitivity satisfies the Individualist Restriction. And, with these four
principles, we can derive thatD is better thanA.Hence we can justifyD’s being better thanAwithout
resorting to moral aggregation in any step. To see this, consider once more the following outcomes:
We then argue as follows:
The Extended Argument for Best Outcomes
(1) F and G are equally good. Pairwise Anonymity
(2) A and E are equally good. (1), Supervenience on Individual Stakes
(3) E and G are equally good. Pairwise Anonymity
(4) D is better than G. The Strong Principle of Dominance
(5) D is better than A. (2), (3), (4), Transitivity
Hence we have an argument that it can be better that two people each get a smaller benefit than that
one person gets a larger benefit. And, crucially, this argument does not rely on moral aggregation.
3. A justification of utilitarianism without moral aggregation
The Extended Argument for Best Outcomes can be used to defend utilitarianism against the
Objection from Moral Aggregation. The argument’s four principles jointly entail, as we shall see,
the same evaluations as utilitarianism given a fixed population of two or more people. In other
words, the four principles of the Extended Argument for Best Outcomes jointly entail a value
ranking of any pair of outcomes in which the same (two or more) people exist, and this ranking will
P1 P2 P3
A 4 0 0
E 2 2 0
F 2 0 2
G 0 2 2
D 0 3 3
19For a further explanation why Supervenience on Individual Stakes doesn’t involve moral aggregation, note that Super-
venience on Individual Stakes is consistent with (and suggested by) Parfit’s (n.d., chap. 6) principle ‘Minimax Loss: The best
outcome is the one in which the greatest loser loses least.’We can generalize Parfit’s principle as follows (matching themodel of
the Minimax-Regret Rule in Savage 1951, 59 and Milnor 1954, 50):
TheMinimax-Loss Principle: Outcome X is at least as good as outcome Y if and only if the greatest loss in well-being for
any person if Y were chosen over X is at least as great as the greatest loss in well-being for any person if X were chosen
over Y.
Given theMinimax-Loss Principle, it would be worse if a single person suffers amajor loss than if a large number of people each
suffers a small loss, other things being equal. This view avoids moral aggregation, yet it entails Supervenience on Individual
Stakes. Therefore, Supervenience on Individual Stakes cannot involve moral aggregation.
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coincide with the utilitarian value ranking of these outcomes. So, given that there are at least two
people, these principles entail a version of utilitarianism which is restricted to evaluations with a
fixed population, namely,
Fixed-Population Utilitarianism: If the same people exist in outcomes X and Y, then X is at
least as good as Y if and only if the sum total of well-being is at least as great in X as in Y.
Moreover, two of the principles in the Extended Argument for Best Outcomes are stronger than
necessary. We can weaken both Transitivity and the Strong Principle of Dominance and still derive
Fixed-Population Utilitarianism. Consider the following weakening of Transitivity:20
Fixed-Population Transitivity: If (i) the same people exist in outcomes X, Y, and Z, (ii) X is at
least as good as Y, and (iii) Y is at least as good as Z, then X at least as good as Z.
And consider the following weakening of the Strong Principle of Dominance:21
TheWeak Principle of Dominance: If (i) some person exists in outcomesX andY, (ii) the same
people exist inX andY, and (iii) each of these people has higher well-being inX than inY, then
X is better than Y.
These weakened principles alongwith Pairwise Anonymity and Supervenience on Individual Stakes
jointly entail the same evaluations as Fixed-Population Utilitarianism for finite populations of at
least two people. We can prove the following theorem:22
Given that the total number of people is finite and greater than one, Fixed-Population
Utilitarianism is true if and only if the following principles are all true:
• Fixed-Population Transitivity,
• Pairwise Anonymity,
• Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and
• The Weak Principle of Dominance.
From this theorem, we have that each one of Fixed-Population Utilitarianism’s evaluations of
outcomes with at least two people can be justified by Fixed-Population Transitivity, Pairwise
Anonymity, Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and the Weak Principle of Dominance. And,
20By weakening Transitivity to fixed-population cases, we avoid some controversial variable-population cases. For example,
the mere-addition paradox (see McMahan 1981, 122–23 and Parfit 1982, 158–60) have lured some people, such as Temkin
(1987), to reject Transitivity.
21You may wonder why clause (i) is needed. Note that without this clause, the Weak Principle of Dominance would be
inconsistent with the existence of unpopulated outcomes. Suppose that no people exist in X and Y. Then clause (ii) holds—see
note 13. And, given the convention that universal quantifications over empty domains are vacuously true, clause (iii) holds too
(see Gustafsson 2020, 129n40). So we would have that X is better than Y and that Y is better than X, which violates the
asymmetry of betterness (see Halldén 1957, 25 and Chisholm and Sosa 1966, 247).
22See appendix A for proof. For some closely related theorems, see Milnor 1954, 53; d’Aspremont and Gevers 1977, 203; and
Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson 2002, 569. Note that these earlier theorems, unlike the one presented in this paper, all
assumeCompleteness, which is controversial. (Completeness is the principle that outcomeX is at least as good as outcomeY orY
is at least as good asX. See Chang 1997 for an overview of the chief worries about Completeness.) Hence the new theorem has an
advantage over these earlier theorems. But, for the main argument in this paper, this difference between these theorems doesn’t
matter much, because Completeness doesn’t involve moral aggregation. Another difference is that my proof relies on Pairwise
Anonymity rather than Anonymity. While this difference is mathematically trivial, it helps my argument that utilitarianism
doesn’t rely on moral aggregation, since—as we saw in note 11—it is more obvious that Pairwise Anonymity avoids moral
aggregation than that Anonymity does so. Moreover, Pairwise Anonymity has the same advantage over Denicolò’s (1999, 276–
77) strengthened variant of Anonymity that allows him to drop Transitivity in his characterization of utilitarianism.
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since none of these principles involves moral aggregation, this justification of Fixed-Population
Utilitarianism does not violate the Individualist Restriction.23 So utilitarianism can sidestep the
Objection from Moral Aggregation.24
To derive the same evaluations as utilitarianism for fixed populations with fewer than two
people, we also need the following principle of the logic of value (Arrow 1951, 14; Chisholm and
Sosa 1966, 248; and Sen 1970, 2; 2017, 47):25
Reflexivity: Outcome X is at least as good as X.
Reflexivity does not involve moral aggregation. It just compares an outcome with itself. So there are
no relevant claims of any individual. We can prove the following corollary:26
Given that the total number of people is finite, Fixed-Population Utilitarianism is true if and




• Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and
• The Weak Principle of Dominance.
But, since we only need Reflexivity to evaluate outcomes with fewer than two people, this corollary
won’t matter for our discussion of moral aggregation. Moral aggregation requires at least two
people.
It may be objected that, if we were to justify utilitarian evaluations with these non-aggregative
principles, we would still end up with extensionally the same evaluations as if we evaluated
outcomes on the basis of their sum total of well-being. So we would still evaluate as if we evaluated
on the basis of moral aggregation. But, first, note that we would also evaluate as if we didn’t evaluate
23If we replace outcomewith prospect andwell-being with expected well-being in these principles, we can justify the following
subjective version of utilitarianism in the same manner without moral aggregation:
Subjective Fixed-Population Utilitarianism: If the same people exist in prospectsX andY, thenX is at least as good asY if
and only if the sum total of expected well-being is at least as great in X as in Y.
24Note that not just any characterization of utilitarianism will do for this purpose, because many such characterizations
include a principle that seems to involve some form of moral aggregation. Still, the proofs in Maskin 1978, 94 and Blackorby,
Bossert, and Donaldson 2005, 118 should also work (but with the slight drawback of some more complicated conditions).
Harsanyi’s (1955, 313–14) social-aggregation theorem could also work, but it requires that we assume the axioms of Expected
Utility Theory for the (personal and impersonal) value orderings of risky prospects. These axioms don’t allow for objective
versions of utilitarianism (see Gustafsson 2019, 194–195 for sources) which take the value of a prospect to be equal to the value
of the outcome that would be the final outcome of the prospect. This violates two axioms of Expected Utility Theory, namely,
Independence (Jensen 1967, 173) and Continuity (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, 26–27 and Blackwell and Girshick
1954, 106). Moreover, Harsanyi’s proof requires that we assume Completeness (see note 22) for both personal and impersonal
value orderings. This, as Broome (1987, 418; 2015, 258–59) points out, is a significant drawback. Notably, the characterization
in this paper does not require Completeness.
25If we allow outcomes without people, then Reflexivity conflicts with Average Utilitarianism, the view that an outcome X is
at least as good as an outcome Y if and only if the average well-being is at least as high in X as in Y. (See, for example, Harsanyi
1955, 316.) Since there is no well-defined average of well-being for outcomes without people, Average Utilitarianism entails that
an outcome without people is not at least as good as itself. (The Evaluative Difference Principle—see note 17—and the
Minimax-Loss Principle—see note 19—yield much the same problem.) To get around this problem, we could replace
Reflexivity with Populated Reflexivity, the principle that, if some person exists in outcome X, then X is at least as good as X.
Given that we replace Reflexivity with Populated Reflexivity and assume that the total number of people is not only finite but
also greater than zero, the corollary will still hold.
26See appendix B for proof.
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on the basis of moral aggregation, since we would also evaluate as if we merely applied the above
principles. And, second, note that, however we evaluate outcomes, there will always be a way of
justifying an extensionally equivalent evaluation of outcomes on the basis of some (perhaps
convoluted) form of moral aggregation. Hence, on the one hand, if the Objection from Moral
Aggregation is that we shouldn’t evaluate as if we evaluated on the basis of moral aggregation, it
seems to prove too much, since it would rule out any way of evaluating outcomes. On the other
hand, if the objection is merely that moral aggregation shouldn’t figure in the justification of
evaluations, then it shouldn’t cause concern about utilitarianism, since, by way of the above
principles, the utilitarian evaluations can be justified without moral aggregation.
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Appendices
A. Proof of the theorem
We shall prove the theorem that, given that the total number of people is finite and greater than one,
Fixed-Population Utilitarianism is true if and only if Fixed-Population Transitivity, Pairwise
Anonymity, Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and the Weak Principle of Dominance are all
true.27
We beginwith the right-to-left direction of the biconditional. Suppose thatX andY are outcomes
with the same people P1,… , Pn. Consider, first, the case where X and Y have the same sum total of
well-being. Starting with this pair of outcomes, we will consider a sequence of pairs of outcomes
where, in each pair, the outcomes are equally good if the outcomes in the next pair are equally as
27The proof technique is essentially the same as in Milnor’s (1954, 53) characterization of the Laplace criterion.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 267
good as each other, until we get to a pair of outcomes that we can show are equally as good as each
other.
(SORT): Perform the following sorting procedure on each outcome in the pair: as long as it is not
the case, for each i = 1,… , n – 1, that Pi has at least as high well-being as Piþ1 in the outcome, find
the smallest integer j such that Pjþ1 has higher well-being than Pj in the outcome and replace the
outcome with an outcome that only differs in that the identities of Pj and Pjþ1 have been permuted.
It follows, from Pairwise Anonymity, that each new outcome is equally as good as the outcome it
replaces. And we have, from Fixed-Population Transitivity, that the resulting sorted outcome is
equally as good as the one we started with. Since there are only a finite number of people in the
outcomes, this procedure will provide, in a finite number of iterations, a new pair of outcomes with
people ordered (P1,… , Pn) by decreasing well-being. And the outcomes in this new pair are equally
good if and only if the outcomes in the previous pair are equally good.
(DECREASE): Then, with the resulting pair of outcomes with people ordered by decreasing well-
being, replace those outcomes by two new outcomes that only differ from the old two respectively in
that each person’s well-being is decreased by whichever is lower of that person’s well-being levels in
the old pair of outcomes.We have, by Supervenience on Individual Stakes, that the outcomes in the
new pair are equally good if and only if the outcomes in the old pair are equally good.
Repeat step SORT followed by step DECREASE until, after a finite number of iterations of these steps,
we have a pair of outcomes in which everyone has zero well-being. To see that this is what we’ll end
upwith, note that we startedwith two outcomeswith an equal sum total of well-being and, after SORT
or DECREASE, we still have two outcomes with an equal sum total of well-being since SORT leaves the
sum totals of well-being unchanged and DECREASE subtracts the same amount of well-being from
both outcomes. After the first iteration of DECREASE, any negative well-being has been cancelled out.
From then on, since the outcomes have the same sum total of well-being, there are people with
positive well-being in one of the outcomes if and only if there are people with positive well-being in
the other outcome. Hence, after each further iteration of SORT, there must be at least one person
(specifically, P1) that has positive well-being in both outcomes. In the next iteration of DECREASE, this
person will then get their well-being decreased by the lowest of their well-being levels in the two
outcomes and thereby end up with zero well-being in at least one of the outcomes. So, with each
iteration of DECREASE after the first one, we have that one of the outcomes will have at least one
further person with zero well-being. Moreover, since all negative well-being has been cancelled out,
DECREASE leaves all people with zero well-being as they are. And SORT leaves the number of people
with zero well-being unchanged. Hence, with each further iteration of DECREASE, we’ll get more and
more people with zero well-being in the outcomes. So, after a finite number of iterations of SORT and
DECREASE, we end up with a pair of outcomes X0 and Y0 where everyone has zero well-being.
Then, let X00 be an outcome that is just like X0 except that the identities of P1 and P2 have been
permuted. By Pairwise Anonymity, we have that X0 and X00 are equally good. For each person in
these outcomes, the difference in their well-being between X0 and Y0 is the same as the difference in
their well-being between X0 and X00—namely, no difference at all. So, by Supervenience on
Individual Stakes, we have that X0 and Y0 are equally good, since X0 and X00 are equally good.
Since the outcomes in the final pair are equally good (that is,X0 andY0 are equally good), we have
that, in each pair in the sequence of pairs we have considered, the outcomes are equally good. Thus
we can conclude that the outcomes in the pair we started with are equally good—that is,X and Y are
equally good. So we have that, if the sum total of well-being is the same inX and Y, then X and Y are
equally good.
We now turn to the case where the sum total of well-being is greater in one of the outcomes. So
suppose now that the sum total of well-being is greater in X than in Y. And, as before, suppose that
the same people exist inX andY. LetX0 andY0 be two outcomes such that (i) the same people exist in
X, Y, X0, and Y0, (ii) X0 has the same sum total of well-being as X, (iii) Y0 has the same sum total of
well-being as Y, and (iv) each of X0 and Y0 is perfectly equal—that is, in each of these outcomes,
everyone has the same level of well-being. Hence we have that the same people exist inX0 andY0 and
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that each of these people has higher well-being in X0 than in Y0. Then, from the Weak Principle of
Dominance, we have that X0 is better than Y0. Since X and X0 have the same sum total of well-being,
we have, by our previous result, that X and X0 are equally good. And, since Y and Y0 have the same
sum total of well-being, we similarly have that Y and Y0 are equally good. Then, from Fixed-
Population Transitivity, we have that X is better than Y.
So, combining these results, we have that X is at least as good as Y if and only if the sum total of
well-being is at least as great in X as in Y. Hence, if Fixed-Population Transitivity, Pairwise
Anonymity, Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and the Weak Principle of Dominance are all
true, then Fixed-Population Utilitarianism is true given a finite population of at least two people.
The second part of the proof—the proof of the biconditional’s left-to-right direction—is trivial.
B. Proof of the corollary
We shall prove the corollary that, given that the total number of people is finite, Fixed-Population
Utilitarianism is true if and only if Fixed-Population Transitivity, Pairwise Anonymity, Reflexivity,
Supervenience on Individual Stakes, and the Weak Principle of Dominance are all true.
We begin with the right-to-left direction of the biconditional. Given the theorem we proved in
appendix A, we only need to cover outcomes with fewer than two people. First, we will consider the
case where X and Y have the same sum total of well-being.
Suppose that only one person exists inX and Y.We have, by Reflexivity, thatX is equally as good
as X. And, for the person in X and Y, the difference in their well-being between X and Y is the same
as the difference in their well-being between X and X—namely, no difference at all. So, by
Supervenience on Individual Stakes, we have that X is equally as good as Y since X is equally as
good as X.
Next, suppose that no people exist inX andY.Wehave, by Reflexivity, thatX is equally as good as
X. Since no people exist in X and Y, we (trivially) have that the same people exist in these
outcomes.28 Then, by Supervenience on Individual Stakes, we have that X and Y are equally good.
Finally, we turn to the case where the sum total of well-being is greater inX than inY. In this case,
there has to be one person who exists in X and Y and who has higher well-being in X than in Y.
Therefore, since there is only one person inX and Y and this person has higher well-being inX than
in Y, we have, from the Weak Principle of Dominance, that X is better than Y.
Hence, if Fixed-Population Transitivity, Pairwise Anonymity, Reflexivity, Supervenience on
Individual Stakes, and the Weak Principle of Dominance are all true, then Fixed-Population
Utilitarianism is true given a finite population. As before, the proof of the biconditional’s left-to-
right direction is trivial.
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